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THE DANGER OF THE "ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS"
REQUIREMENT OF THE ADA: WHY THE INTERACTIVE
PROCESS SHOULD BE MANDATED
ABSTRACT
The 1990 passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
was met with resistance from both courts and employers. This resistance
took the form of a screening mechanism that restrictively interpreted the
definition of "disability." To rectify the narrowed interpretation of disa-
bility, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act
of 2008 (ADAAA), which expanded the definition. Although the
ADAAA has increased the number of individuals covered by the ADA,
the other elements of a plaintiffs prima facie claim for employment dis-
crimination under Title I of the ADA remain the same. Because most
pre-ADAAA disability discrimination litigation concerned whether an
individual had a disability, jurisprudence about the other elements of a
prima facie claim is relatively undeveloped. This lack ofjurisprudence as
well as continued judicial resistance to the ADA raises concerns about
the emergence of a new screening mechanism available to courts: the
"essential functions" requirement of the ADA, which mandates that an
employee be able to perform the essential functions of her job. If the
essential functions requirement were used as a gatekeeper, it would un-
dermine the goals of the ADA. To prevent such abuse, a certain kind of
interactive employer-employee mediation process should be mandated.
Additionally, an employer should be independently liable for failure to
participate in the interactive process.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), plaintiffs bringing disability-based employment discrimi-
nation claims under the ADA faced a disproportionate number of sum-
mary judgments. The disability rights movement, which helped to enact
the ADA, saw the need to amend the ADA because it was not fulfilling
the goals it was meant to achieve--to end the paternalism of, and to fos-
ter integration into everyday life for, people with disabilities.2 The pur-
pose of the ADA Amendment Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was to broaden the
definition of disability because the definition in the original ADA was
somewhat ambiguous, and consequently courts were able to narrow it
significantly in their interpretation of the ADA. Because the ADAAA
did expand the definition of "disability," other elements of a plaintiffs
prima facie claim for disability discrimination under the ADA remained
the same, including the requirement that an individual be "qualified"
(i.e., able to perform) with or without reasonable accommodations, the
"essential functions" of a job.4 The requirement that the employee be
able to perform the essential functions of a job could become an attrac-
tive gatekeeper for courts to continue to block potential plaintiffs from
bringing or prevailing in employment discrimination suits under the
1. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Examining the Correlation Between Disability and Poverty:
A Comment from a Critical Race Feminist Perspective-Helping the Joneses to Keep Up!, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 655, 656-57 (2005) ("[O]nly 2.7% of plaintiffs prevailed in Title I ADA
filed cases, as opposed to 17.2% of plaintiffs in nonemployment ADA cases." (footnote omitted)).
2. Throughout this Comment, I use the phrase "people with disabilities" or "individuals with
disabilities" because politically active Americans with disabilities think that these phrases are more
reverent and less degrading than "the disabled." SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2010).
3. See Hillary K. Valderrama, Comment, Is the ADAAA a "Quick Fix" or Are We out of the
Frying Pan and into the Fire?: How Requiring Parties to Participate in the Interactive Process Can
Effect Congressional Intent Under the ADAAA, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 175, 199-200 (2010).
4. See id. at 204.
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ADA. The recent Tenth Circuit case of EEOC v. Picture People, Inc.5
shows how this requirement could be used as a screening mechanism.
This Comment argues that the use of the essential functions re-
quirement as a screening mechanism would be especially dangerous for
the goals of the disability rights movement. Continually dismissing cases
because the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her job
would reinforce the stereotypes the ADA was enacted to combat: that
people with disabilities are less worthy than are able-bodied individuals
and thus should not be integrated into the world or seen as fully capable
persons.6 To combat the use of the essential functions requirement as a
possible screening mechanism, this Comment suggests that a particular
kind of interactive employer-employee mediation process be mandated
by the ADA.
To contextualize the language of the ADA and the ADAAA, Part I
of this Comment provides a brief background of the ADA's enactment
and its subsequent amendments. Part II shows how the essential func-
tions requirement could be used to block potential plaintiffs from bring-
ing or prevailing in employment discrimination suits under the ADA as
was done in EEOC v. Picture People, Inc. Part III argues that the use of
the essential functions requirement as a screening mechanism would be
especially damaging to the goals of disability rights advocates. Moreo-
ver, this Comment argues that an interactive employer-employee media-
tion process focusing on the essential functions of a job should be man-
dated to keep the essential functions requirement from becoming such a
screening mechanism.
I. BACKGROUND
To help contextualize the ADA and its subsequent amendments,
subpart A explains the goals of the disability rights movement. Subpart B
explains the uniqueness of the original ADA as it encompassed aspects
of both a civil rights statute and welfare legislation.7 Subpart C explains
why and what kind of backlash the original ADA received, and sub-
part D introduces the ADAAA--the legislative response to the ADA
backlash. Finally, subpart E explains why it is important to look to post-
ADAAA disability discrimination litigation to determine whether and
what kind of screening mechanisms could be used by the courts.
A. Goals of the Disability Rights Movement
The ADA, signed into law on July 26, 1990, by President George
H.W. Bush, was heralded as a remarkable step toward rectifyring the dis-
5. 684 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2012).
6. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
7. See id.
8. Id. at 52.
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crimination faced by millions of Americans with disabilities.9 The pur-
pose of the ADA was "to assure equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [individuals
with disabilities]." 10 The ADA's articulation of this goal was largely the
result of the efforts of advocates in the disability rights movement, which
began in the 1970s. 11 Truly understanding the goals and hoes of the
ADA requires first examining the forces behind its enactment. ot
Throughout the disability rights movement, the advocates champi-
oned two major theoretical concepts: anti-paternalism and the social
model of disability.13 The first concept, anti-paternalism, was lifted from
two articles written by Jacobus tenBroek in 1966.14 Professor tenBroek
argued that society's common perceptions and stereotypes about people
with disabilities, much more than any physical impairment itself, creates
substantial limitations on people with disabilities to interact with the
world.' 5 These limitations manifest as a "custodial attitude [that] is typi-
cally expressed in policies of segregation and shelter, of special treat-
ment and separate institutions.,,16 To combat this, tenBroek argued that
disability law should focus on integration.17 His recommendation largely
influenced the goals of the disability rights movement, as seen by the
movement's challenge to society's common response of pitying people
with disabilities.18 Advocates wanted people with disabilities to be seen
as autonomous individuals capable of conducting their own lives. 19
The second concept behind the disability rights movement, the so-
cial model of disability, challenged the typical medical definition of the
word "disability."20 The social model theorizes that the norms of society
determine who is and who is not disabled.21 Viewing people with disabil-
ities as different from the majority has created a world that caters to the
9. Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. Phillips, Overview of Reasonable Accommodation and the
Shifting Emphasis from Who Is Disabled to Who Can Work, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 473 (2011);
Maureen R. Walsh, Note, What Constitutes a "Disability" Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Should Courts Consider Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 918 (1998).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2012).
11. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1409 (1999); see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 2.
12. Eichhorn, supra note 11.
13. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
14. See id. at 2, 4.
15. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966).
16. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 809, 816 (1966).
17. tenBroek, supra note 15, at 843.
18. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
19. See id.
20. See Eichhorn, supra note 11, at 1414-15.
21. See id.
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majority and ignores the needs of people with disabilities.22 Disability
results from the various barriers that society constructs-physical, social,
and attitudinal-which obstruct an individual's ability to truly partake in
society.23 For example, a person in a wheelchair experiences disability
because society has chosen to design buildings with steps and narrow
doorways instead of ramps and wider doorways, even though it would
not have been more expensive to construct the building in an accessible
way.24 Thus, a disability is not an innate condition; rather, it is a social
construction resulting from society's preference for the majority.25 By
challenging the common perception of disability as a problem that needs
to be cured or as a condition that requires pity or charity and instead pos-
iting that society itself perpetuates disabilities, the disability rights
movement hoped that "the proper response [to disability would be] one
that requires society to change its aspects that make some mental or
physical conditions disabling."2 6
The goals of the disability rights movement, and subsequently of the
ADA, reflect these two major concepts. 27 These goals stress integration
into society by effectuating change in societal attitudes.28 It is important
to disability rights advocates to accomplish these goals in a manner that
stresses the recognition of rights over charity.29 Thus, disability rights
advocates desired civil rights legislation as opposed to welfare legislation
to prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities. 30
B. The ADA as a Hybrid of a Civil Rights Statute and Welfare Legisla-
tion
The ADA recognized the disability rights advocates' desire for a
civil rights statute while acknowledging the unique circumstances of
individuals with disabilities. 31 In some instances, individuals with disa-
bilities need different treatment in order to be treated equally.32 There-
fore, unlike other civil rights statutes, the ADA is unique because it
22. See id.
23. Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419,428 (2011).
24. See Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability,
Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 181-84 (2002).
25. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1415 ("Disabled people are not inherently disabled, but are
instead actively disabled by a discriminatory society.").
26. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
27. See id
28. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1418 ("Among the chief goals of the movement, which con-
tinues today, are recognition of disabled people as full human beings and elimination of physical and
attitudinal barriers to their full participation in society." (footnote omitted)).
29. Id; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
30. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4.
31. See id. at 7-8; Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1419.
32. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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"does not simply require equal treatment of similarly situated individu-
als." 33 Instead, the ADA
[r]equir[es] both less and more. The ADA requires more because not
only does it require that individuals with disabilities be treated no
worse than nondisabled individuals with whom they are similarly sit-
uated, but, in certain contexts, it requires that they be treated differ-
ently, some might say better, to achieve equal footing. The ADA ar-
guably requires less because, if the disabled individual cannot do the
job, even with reasonable assistance, the employer is not obligated to
employ that individual. 34
The ADA was initially celebrated for its unique approach to com-
bating disability discrimination; however, the Act was met with substan-
tial backlash not only from employers35 but also from the judiciary. 36
This resistance stemmed from a fear that the ADA provided claimants
with preferential treatment, and it was often characterized as an affirma-
tive action statute.37 The judicial backlash manifested in a disproportion-
ate number of summary judgments for defendants due to claimants' fail-
ure to qualify as disabled under the ADA definition of "disability." 38 A
more detailed account of the nature and extent of the backlash is dis-
cussed below.
C Judicial Backlash
To establish a prima facie case for disability discrimination under
the original ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is qualified (with or without a reasona-
ble accommodation) to perform the essential functions of the position she
has or desires; and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action
against an employee with a disability because of her disability.39 The
definition of "disability" under the original ADA was as follows: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an im-
pairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."40 In the
33. Collins & Phillips, supra note 9, at 471.
34. Id.
35. Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REv. 311, 315 (2009).
36. Id.; see also Collins & Phillips, supra note 9; Scott Johnson, The ADAAA: Congress
Breathes New Life into the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 J. KAN. B. Ass'N 22, 23 (2012).
37. Johnson, supra note 36 ("Many courts characterized it as an affirmative action program
for the disabled, rather than as an antidiscrimination statute. Even the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
referred to certain accommodations as 'preferences for individuals with disabilities."' (footnote
omitted) (quoting Travis, supra note 35, at 318)).
38. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ l2111-12112 (2012).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012).
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following two cases, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the ADA
definition of "disability."
In Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc.,41 the Supreme Court sub-
stantially narrowed the definition of "disability," making it more difficult
for claimants to overcome defendant employers' motions for summary
judgment.42 In an opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, the Sutton
Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit,43 holding that courts
should consider mitigating measures, such as an individual's medications
or treatments, when determining whether one has a disability for purpos-
es of the ADA. 44 Additionally, the Sutton Court's opinion highlighted the
demanding nature of fulfilling a "regarded as [disabled]" claim under the
ADA. 45 Under a regarded as disabled claim, a plaintiff must show not
only that the employer held a misconception about the plaintiffs im-
pairment but also that the employer believed that the plaintiffs impair-
ment substantially limited a major life activity.46
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,47 the
Supreme Court defined "major life activities" as "those activities that are
of central importance to daily life."48 To support this definition, the
Toyota Court declared that the ADA's definition of disability "need[s] to
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as
disabled," 49 further narrowing the definition of disability under the ADA.
D. Result of Sutton and Toyota: The Americans with Disabilities
Amendments Act
Sutton and Toyota made it extremely difficult to prevail with an
employment discrimination claim under the ADA.5 0 Research showed
that only 2.7% of plaintiffs prevailed in employment discrimination cases
filed under the ADA, as opposed to 17.2% of plaintiffs in non-
employment ADA cases51 and 58.0% of plaintiffs in all federal civil cas-
es-an enormous disparity.52 The rulings in Sutton and Toyota left plain-
tiffs in a catch-22 situation in which they either were not "disabled
enough" to warrant protection under the Act or were "too disabled" to
qualify for the jobs they desired.53 One scholar noted that the "judicial
41. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
42. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 24.
43. Id.
44. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
45. Id. at 489.
46. Id.
47. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
48. Id. at 185.
49. Id. at 197.
50. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 25.
51. Wing, supra note 1, at 656.
52. Id. at 656-57.
53. Johnson, supra note 36, at 25-26; Valderrama, supra note 3, at 198.
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hostility to the ADA ran so deep that Congressional response seemed
inevitable." 54 Disability rights advocates persuaded "members of the
business community to negotiate a compromise bill to restore the ADA's
protected class to the scope originally intended by Congress, in exchange
for several provisions that precluded the potential expansion of rights and
coverage under other disputed sections of the original ADA."55 On Sep-
tember 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the ADAAA. 56 The
ADAAA sought to correct the narrow interpretation of "disability" that
resulted from Sutton and Toyota.57
The ADAAA made several changes to the ADA. First, with regard
to mitigating measures, the ADAAA affirmatively states that they should
not be considered when determining if an individual has a disability.58
This provision directly addressed the Supreme Court's ruling in Sutton
that mitigating measures should be considered in assessing whether a
plaintiff has a disability.59 Second the ADAAA made proving a regarded
as disabled claim easier for employees, as the employee only has "to
show an adverse employment action was taken because the employer
'perceived' an impairment-which can be any condition with an ex-
pected duration of more than six months." 60 The plaintiff no longer must
show that her employer believed that the impairment substantially lim-
ited a major life activity.61 Third, in response to the Supreme Court's
definition of "major life activities" in Toyota, the ADAAA expanded
what constitutes a major life activity, including such things as "standing,
lifting, bending, reading and concentrating, along with performing man-
ual tasks, thinking, eating, sleeping and communicating."62 Additionally,
the ADAAA states that major life activities include "the operation of a
major bodily function."63 "Further broadening the coverage of the [A]ct,
the ADAAA makes clear that impairments that are episodic or in remis-
sion are still protected disabilities if they would substantially limit a ma-
jor life activity when active."64 Fourth, the ADAAA also states that the
term "substantially limits" should not mean "significantly restricted" as
some courts had held because that was "too high a standard." 65
54. Travis, supra note 35, at 319.
55. Id.
56. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 52.
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (2012).
59. Stephanie Wilson & E. David Krulewicz, Disabling the ADAAA, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2009, at
37, 39.
60. Id. at 38.
61. See id.
62. Wilson & Krulewicz, supra note 59, at 38 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
64. Wilson & Krulewicz, supra note 59, at 38 (citing 42 U.S.C. 12102(4)(D)); see also
BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 53.
65. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-3554.
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One major component of the Act remained unchanged.66 To estab-
lish a prima facie claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must still prove
that she was qualified, either with or without reasonable accommoda-
67tions. A "qualified individual" is defined as "an individual who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 68
Thus, an individual must still show that she can perform the essential
functions of the position and that her accommodations were reasonable. 69
E. Litigation After the ADAAA Enactment
The ADAAA took effect on January 1, 2009,70 and it did not apply
retroactively.71 Therefore, the volume of litigation applying the new as-
pects of the ADAAA is relatively limited. Because cases prior to the
ADA dealt exclusively with the definition of "disability" and did not
develop the other elements of a prima facie case,72 it is important to look
at whether the ADAAA is receiving the same kind of backlash as did the
original ADA and whether a new screening mechanism has been erected
by the courts, resulting in a disproportionate number of summary judg-
ments for defendants. This prospect seems likely, considering the
ADAAA has been criticized for opening the floodgates of litigation by
expanding the definition of "disability."
II. EEOC V. PICTURE PEOPLE, INC.
In EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., the Tenth Circuit recently demon-
strated that an employee's ability to meet the essential functions of a job
could potentially be used as a gatekeeping mechanism for employment
discrimination claims brought under the ADAAA. An analysis of the
case and its potential impact on the future of disability discrimination
litigation under the ADAAA follows.
66. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
67. See id
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
69. See id
70. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-3554.
71. Kerri Stone, Substantial Limitations: Reflections on the ADAAA, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 509, 514 (2011).
72. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 204.
73. Amelia Michelle Joiner, The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
331, 366 (2010) ("[T]he enactment of the ADAAA . . . '[could] open a 'Pandora's Box' of claims by
people who do not have a disability under any rational interpretation of that term.'" (second altera-
tion in original) (quoting Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Hearing on S. 1881 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions,
I10th Cong. 34 (2007) (statement of Camille A. Olson, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP))).
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A. Facts
The plaintiff, Jessica Chrysler, was an employee at Picture People,
Inc., a photography studio in Littleton, Colorado. 74 She was "profoundly
deaf," but she could communicate through "writing notes, gesturing,
pointing, and miming. She [could] also type, text message, and use body
language."75 Jessica could also use American Sign Language (ASL), but
according to Picture People, she could not read lips or speak many
words.76
Jessica was hired as a "performer" for the photography studio,
which entailed "customer intake, sales, portrait photography, and labora-
tory duties." 77 Another performer usually aided Jessica when she shot
photographs in the studio, but she was occasionally able to shoot by her-
self.78 On such occasions, Jessica would communicate with her photog-
raphy subjects, who were usually children, "by writing notes, gesturing,
and miming." 79
In November 2007, Master Photographer Libby Johnston was sent
to Picture People "to improve photography quality and sales in anticipa-
tion of the holidays., Jessica claimed that she requested an ASL inter-
preter for a training session held by Johnston, but Picture People was
unable to provide one. Johnston's evaluation of Jessica focused on Jes-
sica's communication skills, which Johnston maintained were "awkward,
cumbersome, and impractical."82 After conferring with Johnston, Picture
People's district manager recommended and Picture People agreed that
Jessica be "almost exclusively" relocated to the photography lab. 83
Jessica was relocated and her hours were cut, after which she re-
quested more hours.84 Jessica was denied more hours, and management
reported that she was "angry" and less productive at work. After the
2007 holiday season, Jessica remained an employee but was not allotted
work hours at the photography studio.86 She was officially terminated in
October 2008.87
74. EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 983-84 (10th Cir. 2012).
75. Id. at 983.
76. Id. at 983-84.








85. Id at 984-85.
86. Id. at 985.
87. Id.
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B. Procedural History
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued un-
der Title I of the ADA on Jessica's behalf, claiming employment dis-
crimination on the basis of a disability. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the employer.89 The district court determined
that Jessica could not meet a prima facie case for discrimination under
the ADAAA because she could not perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodations. 90
C. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's ruling de novo and
affirmed.91 The court stated the elements needed to show a prima facie
case for discrimination under the ADAAA-that the employee "(1) be a
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job
held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employer or pro-
spective employer because of that disability." 92 The parties agreed that
Jessica was disabled, so the opinion hinged on the second element of
disability discrimination. 93
The issue concerned whether verbal communication skills constitut-
ed an essential function of the job of performer.94 The majority empha-
sized the need to first inquire as to whether the emplo er required all
performers to have strong verbal communication skills. If so, the court
must next inquire as to "whether verbal communication skills are funda-
mental to the performer position."96 This inquiry considers the following
factors:
(i) [t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or inter-
viewing applicants for the job;
(iii) [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) [t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform
the function;
(v) [t]he terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
88. See id
89. Id
90. Id. at 983.
91. Id. at 983, 985.
92. Id. at 985.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id. at 985-86.
96. Id
7252013]
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(vi) [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 97
The court concluded that Jessica was "unable to fully perform three
of the four duties of a performer."98 Although she could perform in the
lab, she did not possess the ability to proficiently register and recruit
customers, instruct children while taking their pictures, or sell photo
packages by addressing customer issues. Her limited abilities, the court
reasoned, were problematic, especially because Picture People allowed
only twenty minutes for each photo shoot. 00
Because the court determined that Jessica was unable to perform the
essential functions of the job, the court considered whether there were
reasonable accommodations that the employer could provide that would
enable her to perform those essential functions.lo0 The court defined rea-
sonable accommodations as
"[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability
who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position" or
"[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's em-
ployee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of em-
ployment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
without disabilities."
The majority opinion first stated that a reasonable accommodation
could not consist of allowing Jessica to communicate non-verbally be-
cause it could not require an employer to eliminate an essential function
of the job.103 The majority opinion then stated that providing Jessica with
an ASL interpreter at staff meetings would not allow her to perform the
essential functions of her job because verbal communication needed to
occur during photo sessions.104 In light of these circumstances, the court
concluded that no reasonable accommodation could have allowed Jessica
to perform the essential functions of herjob.o10




101. Id. at 987.
102. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii)-(iii) (2012)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 987-88.
105. Id. at 988.
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D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Holloway offered a dissent that began by presenting a more
detailed account of the facts of the case.106 The dissent pointed out that
Picture People had hired Jessica knowing she was deaf and knowing the
duties of a performer.107
The dissent also noted that Jessica's start time had been delayed
three weeks because Picture People failed to provide an interpreter for
her training session.los The manager of the studio contacted Picture Peo-
ple's human resources department but was told that Picture People did
not provide those services in an e-mail stating that "hiring an interpreter
'to be around the studio while this employee is working ... seems like an
expense we would like to do without."" 0 9 Eventually, Jessica found her
. . .110
own interpreter to aid her during her job training session.
The dissent emphasized that Jessica had received highly favorable
reviews for her photography sessions with children and there was no
evidence that her sessions were unsuccessful. II In fact, just days after
her training session, Jessica had a photo shoot with a family who was so
pleased with her erformance, it purchased more photos than it had orig-
inally planned. Consequently, the family returned to the studio the
next month for another photo shoot with Jessica, but Picture People
falsely informed the family that Jessica was unavailable when, in fact,
Jessica was working in the lab at the time.113
The dissent noted that despite Jessica's positive performance, Pic-
ture People reassigned Jessica to the lab following a staff training session
for which she requested but was not provided an interpreter." 4 Follow-
ing this reassignment, Picture People cut her hours significantly.11s She
requested more hours and was promised an increase; eventually Picture
People cut her hours altogether.116 Finally, Picture People terminated
Jessica after months of waiting to see if she would get more hours. 17 On
top of everything, the dissent concluded, Picture Peo le reprimanded
Jessica when she complained about her hour reduction.
106. Id. at 992 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
107. Id
108. Id at 994.
109. Id. (alteration in original).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 992.
112. Id. at 994-95.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 995.
115. See id. at 996.
116. Id. at 996-97
117. Id. at 997.
118. Id. at 992-93.
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The dissent reasoned that summary judgment for the defendant em-
ployer was inappropriate. There was substantial evidence from which a
jury could decide that verbal communications skills were not an essential
function of the job but instead were a method used to perform an essen-
tial function of the job, which was communication in general.119 The
dissent stated that none of the descriptions of the job, either written by
Picture People before Jessica's employment or given from witnesses
during trial, stated that verbal communication was an essential function
of the job. 120Thus, there was enough evidence to preclude summary
judgment. 121
Additionally, the dissent disagreed with the court's holding that Jes-
sica's written communication and gestures were less effective than was
oral communication.122 Jessica received no negative feedback from cus-
tomers about her performance while photographing children.123 On the
contrary, Jessica showed that she could communicate effectively by re-
ceiving positive feedback about her performance.124 The dissent stated
that "[o]nly by ignoring this clear example of [Jessica's] ability to per-
form the essential functions of photo shooting and sales can the majority
find that 'nothing suggests' that she could do that which she had in fact
already done."' 2
Finally, the dissent remarked that the determination of whether
something is an essential function of a job is a question for the jury.126
The dissent emphasized that "[a] jury could determine that the Employ-
er's decisions were based on exactly the kind of stereotypes that the
ADA was enacted to combat." 27
III. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in EEOC v. Picture People, Inc. is illustrative
of the dangerous potential of judicial backlash towards the ADAAA in
the form of granting summary judgment for employer defendants on the
basis of employees lacking the ability to perform an essential job func-
tion. The essential functions requirement could be a new screening
mechanism courts employ to combat the "flood of litigation" the
ADAAA arguably unleashes.128 As the dissent in Picture People con-
veyed, the grant of summary judgment for the defendant was unwarrant-
119. Id. at 999.






126. Id. at 1000.
127. Id.
128. Joiner, supra note 73, at 336.
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ed.129 Even if summary judgment were warranted, the problems Jessica
experienced at her job highlight the failure or lack of an interactive pro-
cess through which the employer and employee discuss what the essen-
tial functions of the job will be and what, if any, reasonable accommoda-
tions the employee will need to perform the job's duties.
This Comment argues that a mandated interactive process should be
implemented as part of establishing a prima facie case for disability dis-
crimination. First, subpart A explains why judicial backlash to the origi-
nal ADA occurred, and predicts why a similar backlash in the form of
using the essential job functions requirement as a gatekeeper is a real
possibility. Second, subpart B discusses the dangers of using the essential
job functions requirement as gatekeeper because it would seriously un-
dermine the goals of the ADAAA. Subpart C explains the interactive
employer-employee mediation process and suggests that it should be
mandated for employers to participate in such a process with an employ-
ee if the employer knows or should know that the employee has a disa-
bility. If an employer does not participate in an interactive process, the
employee's claim should prevail. Finally, subpart D outlines what an
effective interactive process should look like.
A. Explaining the Judicial Backlash
Although the ADAAA was signed into law in September 2008, it
only applies to adverse employment actions taken after the effective date
of January 1, 2009.130 Therefore, the first cases interpreting the ADAAA
have taken some time to surface.131 Consequently, any meaningful trends
regarding the judicial reaction to the ADAAA are limited.132 Whether a
new screening mechanism will emerge remains to be seen; however,
there is reason to believe that a similar form of judicial backlash will
occur.133 Because ADA jurisprudence is wrought with ambiguities and
the ADAAA will likely result in more disability-based employment dis-
crimination litigation, it is also likely that judicial backlash will again
take the form of a screening mechanism to control the increased volume
of cases.134
A new gatekeeping mechanism could potentially develop via the
other prima facie elements of a plaintiffs employment discrimination
claim: the essential functions requirement and the reasonable accommo-
dation requirement.135 Because so many cases under the original ADA
129. Picture People, 684 F.3d at 1000.
130. Jana K. Terry, The ADA Amendment Acts Three Years After Passage: The EEOC's Final
Regulations and the First Court Decisions Emerge at Last, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2011, at 49,49.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Valderrama, supra note 3, at 202-03.
134. Id.
13'. See id. at 204.
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focused on whether a plaintiff had a disability, case law concerning
whether a plaintiff can perform the essential functions of a job, or wheth-
er a requested accommodation is reasonable, is less developed.136 Be-
cause these areas of law are less developed, courts still have latitude in
"end[ing] the inquiry at the coverage stage based on the plaintiffs quali-
fications (including whether she can perform essential job functions or
whether the accommodation was reasonable), achieving the same result
as the restrictive definition of disability."1 37
In any case, it is important to understand why courts would imple-
ment such a mechanism. Understanding the judicial backlash helps pre-
dict the form said mechanism could take and helps in the development of
a solution. There are several explanations for the judicial resistance to the
original ADA (and the consequent reaction of the restrictive definition of
disability).138 First, courts may have been reacting to the special nature
of the ADA as a blended civil rights and welfare statute.139 Other civil
rights statutes prohibit employers from discriminating against an em-
ployee based on that employee's protected status.140 The protected status,
such as race, gender, age, or religion, is generally irrelevant to an em-
ployee's ability to perform a job.141 The ADA concerns and protects
individuals whose disabilities may legitimately impact job performance
and requires that emplo vers accommodate those individuals at the em-
ployer's own expense. Thus, courts may have viewed claimants as
underserving, or even worse, as "really just lazy, malingerers, or whin-
ers.',143 Second, courts may have been reluctant to impose costs on em-
ployers. 144 After all, employers are not responsible for plaintiffs' disa-
bilities, and "it might thus seem unreasonable to require them to absorb
costs associated with these conditions."l 45
136. See id.
137. Id. (footnote omitted).
138. See Hickox, supra note 23, at 426-28.
139. See id. at 426-27 ("Some experts attribute ADA plaintiffs' lack of success in workplace
discrimination claims to a lack of acceptance of the ADA's protections among the courts, employers,
and other members of society, and an unwillingness to accept the disabled or 'the notion that the
ADA is about rights and equality."' (quoting Sharona Hoffman et al., The Definition of Disability in
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Its Successes and Shortcomings: Proceedings of the 2005
Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Sections on Employment Discrimination
Law; Labor Relations and Employment Law; and Law, Medicine and Health Care, 9 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL'Y J. 473, 494 (2005) (comments of Chai R. Feldblum))); see also Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 40 (2000);
Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 326-
27, (2008) [hereinafter Hoffman, Settling the Matter].
140. See Hoffman, Settling the Matter, supra note 139, at 327.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Hickox, supra note 23, at 427.
144. Hoffman, Settling the Matter, supra note 139, at 327.
145. Id.
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On a theoretical level, courts' resistance to the ADA may have
stemmed from the prevailing medical definition of the word "disabil-
ity.,,146 As discussed in Part I.A, the medical model of disability treats
disability not as a social problem but as an individual medical problem
with only a medical solution. 147 Thus, courts may have viewed discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities as rational "'[because it re-
sults from] their own bodies' deficiencies,' unlike discrimination against
other groups," which results from animus. 148
The reason for the judicial backlash appears to be more than just an
unwillingness to impose costs on employers. Rather, the courts' main
concern about enforcing the ADA seems to be that individuals with disa-
bilities do not deserve protection because (1) their disabilities actually
can affect job performance and (2) they are not being discriminated
against in the typical sense, as there is not always animus behind adverse
employment actions.
Given these concerns, courts are likely to see the essential functions
requirement as an attractive candidate for a new screening mechanism. If
courts do use the essential functions requirement as a screening mecha-
nism, it would put the focus of litigation on the individual with a disabil-
ity's perceived shortcomings rather than on how employers can change
their practices to better integrate employees with disabilities into the
workplace. This focus on the individual with a disability would reflect
the courts' view that disabilities negatively affect job performance, and
that employers generally act rationally when they take adverse employ-
ment action against individuals with disabilities. Therefore, the reasoning
of the courts goes, it is unfair to place financial burdens on employers
because they act rationally and without animus.
B. Using the "Essential Functions" Requirement as a Gatekeeper Would
Undermine the Goals of the ADAAA
If the essential functions requirement were systematically used as a
screening device, the goals of disability rights advocates would be seri-
ously undermined. The chilling effect on the ability of disability discrim-
ination litigants to bring successful claims would be similar to that which
the judicial interpretation of the definition of "disability" had on litigants
pre-ADAAA. As one scholar noted:
[T]he specific wording of the ADA's definition of "disability," bor-
rowed from the earlier Rehabilitation Act, has undercut the statute's
goal of fostering greater participation in society on the part of people
146. Hickox, supra note 23, at 427-28.
147. Id.
148. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just
Right": The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND.
L.J. 181, 181-82 (2008)).
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with disabilities. The problematic language in the definition fails to
reflect the congressional intent to cover people with a broad range of
physical and mental impairments, and it actually cuts against several
of the theoretical underpinnings of the disability rights movement. 149
If the essential functions requirement of the ADAAA is used as a gate-
keeper for disability discrimination claims, it, like the gatekeeping that
occurred pursuant to the ADA's definition of "disability," could un-
dermine the disability rights movement.
The disability rights movement sought to integrate individuals with
disabilities into society and end paternalism toward them.151 The essen-
tial functions requirement to block potential plaintiffs would seriously
undermine those goals because it requires making a judgment about
those individuals' abilities. As highlighted by the dissent in Picture Peo-
ple,152 an employer's assessment of the capacities of an individual with a
disability can reflect common stereotypes about people with disabili-
ties.153
Furthermore, focusing on the employee's limitations themselves-
as opposed to focusing on whether an accommodation is reasonable or
on whether an employer participated in an interactive process-
reinforces the common stereotype that individuals with disabilities are
lesser human beings.154 The focus on limitations ignores that society
needs to change, which is a major goal of the disability rights movement.
Rather, it emphasizes the shortcomings of the individual herself (whether
those shortcomings are real or assumed based on stereotypes). Thus, the
real or perceived limitations of plaintiffs with disabilities would be sys-
tematically scrutinized. Again, the focus of disability discrimination cas-
es should be on how society should change,155 not on how an individu-
al's disability makes her unqualified for a position.
149. Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1408.
150. See id,
151. BAGENSTOS, supra note 2, at 4-6.
152. EEOC v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 1000 (10th Cir. 2012) (Holloway, J., dissent-
ing).
153. See Eichhom, supra note 11, at 1416 ("[Nlon-disabled people find it difficult to under-
stand how people can live full, satisfying lives despite mental and physical impairments . . . ."); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 423 (2000)
("[P]eople with disabilities may be deprived of opportunities because of stereotypes-overbroad
generalizations about the limiting effects of their impairments.").
154. See Eichhorn, supra note I1, at 1411-12 ("Those who wish to draw lines-to reify disa-
bility-are simply trying to ensure their own place on the correct, 'normal' side. They can then
assume that those on the other side are somehow lesser humans, whose primary need in life is a cure
that will allow them to join the ranks of the normal." (footnotes omitted)); see also Jonathan C.
Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal
Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1343 (1993)
("Frequently, people with disabilities are stigmatized as less than human . . . .").
155. This is not to say that there should be or is no limit to what employers are obliged to
accommodate. The ADA provides an "undue hardship" defense to an accommodation request, even
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C. The Interactive Process
Mandating that employers participate in an interactive employer-
employee mediation process and be subject to liability for failure to do so
could refocus employment discrimination cases back onto how society
needs to change. Courts disagree as to whether the interactive process is
required.156 Many courts only require that an employer participate in an
interactive process if an employee has requested such an accommoda-
tion. 157 Courts also disagree about the consequences an employer faces
for failure to participate in the interactive process. 15 The EEOC regula-
tions provide that in the interactive process, the employer and employee
should
(1) [a]nalyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose
and essential functions; (2) [c]onsult with the individual with a disa-
bility to ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by the
individual's disability and how those limitations could be overcome
with a reasonable accommodation; (3) [i]n consultation with the in-
dividual to be accommodated, identify potential accommodations and
assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the individual to
perform the essential functions of the position; and (4) [c]onsider the
if that request is reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2012) ("The term 'undue hardship' means an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of [several] factors[,
including] (i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed . . ; (ii) the overall financial re-
sources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial re-
sources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (iv) the type of opera-
tion or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.").
156. See, e.g., John R. Autry, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers
Required to Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say "Yes" but the Law Says "No,"
79 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 665, 677-685 (2004); Alysa M. Barancik, Comment, Determining Reasona-
ble Accommodations Under the ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an
"Interactive Process," 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 527 (1999); Valderrama, supra note 3, at 206.
Compare Picard v. St. Tammany Parish Hosp., 423 F. App'x 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing requested jury instruction in ADA case that
failure to engage in the interactive process once accommodation was requested constituted per se
violation of the ADA), with Livingston v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 388 F. App'x 738, 741 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that employers are required to engage in an interactive process with employees to
identify and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations).
157. Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process: The Employer and Employee's Duty to
Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is More than a Game of Five Card Stud, 77
NEB. L. REV. 281, 287 (1998).
158. Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 615, 627-28 (2004) ("While at least one circuit court decision has suggested that independent
liability may exist under the ADA for a party who fails to participate in the interactive process, most
courts hold that liability will arise only where an employer has failed to implement a reasonable
accommodation that would enable a disabled employee to perform adequately in the workplace.
Taking a somewhat different tack, a growing number of circuit courts have ruled that an employer's
failure to engage in the interactive process ordinarily should warrant a trial court's refusal to grant an
employer's motion for summary judgment." (footnote omitted)).
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preference of the individual to be accommodated and select and im-
plement the accommodation that is most appropriate for both the em-
ployee and the employer.159
1. The Benefits of an Interactive Process
A requirement that an employer participate in an interactive process
in good faith with the risk that failure to participate will result in inde-
pendent liability could potentially decrease litigation,160 benefit employ-
ers financially,161 and reinforce the notion that society needs to change,
not the individual with a disability.
A mandated interactive process would allow employees to deter-
mine what kind of accommodations an employer could provide. 162In
turn, the employee would have the opportunity to suggest alternatives,
which might be less costly for the employer.163 Along the same lines, an
employer could "overestimate the costs of an accommodation without
input from the employee."'164 Furthermore, "the interactive process has
many of the same benefits as mediated settlements; it is 'cheaper than
litigation, [and] can help preserve confidentiality, allow the employee to
stay on the job, and avoid monetary damages for an employer's initially
hostile responses to requests for accommodations."'
1 65
Finally, mandating an interactive process would reinforce the idea
that society needs to change because it requires slightly more from an
employer. For people with disabilities to be truly given an equal oppor-
tunity to succeed in the workplace and beyond, the goal should continue
to be integrating individuals with disabilities into society as much as
possible.
2. The Kind of Interactive Process to Mandate
The Third Circuit requires participation in the interactive process.166
To prove that an employer violated the requirement to participate, the
Third Circuit provides that a plaintiff needs to show:
"(1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; (2) the em-
ployee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disabil-
ity; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the
employee in seeking accommodations; and (4) the employee could
159. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 208.




164. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disabil-
ity Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 154 (2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 316
n.6 (3d Cir. 1999)).
166. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317.
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have been reasonably accommodated" had the employer made a good
faith effort to do so.
The interactive process should focus less on whether a reasonable
accommodation existed and more on whether the employer made a good
faith effort to discuss with the employee the essential job functions. 6 8
Additionally, the employee should not be required to request an accom-
modation in order to trigger a required interactive process.
a. An Employer Should Communicate with the Employee
About the Essential Job Functions
The determination of whether an employee could be reasonably ac-
commodated depends on the essential functions of the job. If the em-
ployer does not communicate these functions to the employee, then it is
unfair to protect an employer from liability when no reasonable accom-
modation could have been provided because, in some cases, the essential
functions of the job are decided only after a claim is brought.
The facts from Picture People exemplify this unfairness. The em-
ployer clearly knew about Jessica's disability, and Jessica asked for a
reasonable accommodation by requesting an ASL interpreter. At this
point, an interactive process should have occurred, in which the employ-
er could have articulated to Jessica that verbal communication was an
essential function of the job of performer and that there was no reasona-
ble accommodation available. However, no interactive process occurred,
and the verbal communication essential job function was only declared
after the plaintiff filed her claim. As a result, before the claim was filed,
the plaintiff did not know what the essential functions of her job were
and thus could not know whether a reasonable accommodation existed.
Additionally, it seems that Picture People decided that verbal communi-
cation was an essential job function after Jessica brought her claim. Had
Jessica claimed that Picture People should have been liable because it did
not in good faith participate in an interactive process, Jessica would have
been awarded no remedy because no reasonable accommodation was
available. This result is unfair given that Jessica did not know while em-
ployed what the essential functions of her job were, or consequently,
whether a reasonable accommodation would have allowed her to perform
those essential functions.
167. Valderrama, supra note 3, at 209 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142,
165 (3d Cir. 1999), vacated on reh'g on other grounds, 184 F.3d 296 (1999).
168. These two inquiries (whether a reasonable accommodation exists and whether an employ-
ee can perform the essential functions of a job) are separate inquires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012)
("The term 'qualified individual' means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.").
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Therefore, an employee should not be required to show that she
could have been reasonably accommodated unless the employer partici-
pated in an interactive process in which the essential functions of the job
were discussed.
b. An Employee Should Not Have to Request a Reasonable
Accommodation to Trigger the Interactive Process
If an employer knows or should know that an employee has a disa-
bility, the interactive process should take place regardless of whether the
employee has requested a reasonable accommodation. It would be in
both parties' best interest to discuss the essential functions of the job and
what reasonable accommodations might be available.169 Additionally,
employees might not know that they can request accommodations. Em-
ployers are likely to know of their obligations due to licenses they obtain
to do business in the state. Thus, there should be no obligation that an
employee ask for reasonable accommodations to trigger the requirement
for an interactive process.
c. What the Interactive Process Mandate Should Look Like
Although Picture People was not decided on the issue of a required
interactive process, I believe that it should have. A plaintiff should prove
the following elements to show that an employer violated the ADA re-
quirement to participate in the interactive process: (1) the employer knew
or should have known about the employee's disability; (2) the employer
did not make a good faith effort to discuss with the employee the essen-
tial functions of the job and to assist the employee in seeking accommo-
dations; and (3) the employee could have been reasonably accommodat-
ed had the employer made a good faith effort to do so. Thus, if an em-
ployer failed to communicate to the employee the essential functions of
her job, the employer would be in violation of the ADA and would be
independently liable.
By mandating an interactive process like the one described, em-
ployment discrimination claims brought under Title I of the ADA would
focus more on how society can help stop discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities, rather than on the limitations of these individuals.
This process would be more consistent with the goals of the ADA and
would offer other benefits to both employees and employers; it could
potentially avert subsequent lawsuits, saving employers the time and
expense of litigation, and reinforce the notion that society needs to
change, not the individual with a disability.
169. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Picture People shows that the essential function requirement of the
ADA could be used as a screening mechanism in employment discrimi-
nation cases based on disability. Permitting courts to systematically use
this requirement to screen out cases would undermine the goals of the
ADA. To prevent this outcome, the ADA should mandate that employers
participate in an interactive process that focuses not only on reasonable
accommodations but also on the essential job functions. This mandate
would remove the focus from the real or perceived shortcomings of an
individual with a disability, place the focus back onto society, and serve
to better integrate individuals with disabilities into the workplace.
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